Eurípides se distingue entre los autores de tragedia por la habilidad con que transforma los estereotipos mitológicos en seres con una identidad personal concreta. Son distintas las estrategias a las que recurre con este fin. Una de ellas consiste en presentarlos a través de otros mostrando a la vez su actuación y sus condicionantes psicológicos; otro recurso que utiliza es dejar entrever el???? de los personajes en los discursos que pronuncian, así como sus capacidades retóricas. Una tercera técnica es la (...) de crear enfrentamientos entre dos parejas de personajes de las que uno es un dios y otro un mortal. En todas estas técnicas, que maneja con gran pericia retórica, hay siempre una idea que subyace y que sirve de filtro y de fondo de discusión. En el caso de Alcestis, la piedra de toque del???? es el?????, la ley o costumbre y la interpretación que de ella hacen los protagonistas. (shrink)

This work extend to residuated lattices the results of [7]. It also provides a possible generalization to this context of frontal operators in the sense of [9].Let L be a residuated lattice, and f : Lk → L a function. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for f to be compatible with respect to every congruence on L. We use this characterization of compatible functions in order to prove that the variety of residuated lattices is locally affine complete.We study (...) some compatible functions on residuated lattices which are a generalization of frontal operators. We also give conditions for two operations P(x, y) and Q(x, y) on a residuated lattice L which imply that the function \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${x \mapsto min\{y \in L : P(x, y) \leq Q(x, y)\}}$$\end{document} when defined, is equational and compatible. Finally we discuss the affine completeness of residuated lattices equipped with some additional operators. (shrink)

In his book SEXUAL DESIRE, Roger Scruton wrongly maintains that human sexual experience is essential intentional. His thesis depends on his highly revisionary definition of 'sexual desire', the artificial nature of which I expose and criticise. He admits that homosexual desire is capable of the same kind of intentionality as heterosexual desire, and is therefore not intrinsically obscene or perverted, but he advances reasons why homosexuality is morally different from heterosexuality and is therefore an object of disapproval. His arguments presuppose (...) 'an impassable moral divide' between the sexes, and are, on his own admission, not very cogent. Since he allows that homosexual desire is a natural and spontaneous phenomenon and also proposes that moral education should guide us towards a state in which our sexuality is entirely integrated within a life of personal affection and responsibility, consistency requires that he adopt a sexual ideology which does not discriminate against homosexuality. For homosexuals are unlikely to achieve the 'sexual integrity' which Scruton advocates (and which I endorse) if they are constantly encouraged to disparage their own sexual nature and if social institutions make no positive provision for them. (shrink)

This chapter examines the role of shopfloor knowledge in the operation of advanced manufacturing systems. Design trends towards full automation are contrasted with those toward hybrid, human-centred systems with particular emphasis on job design and the development and reproduction of knowledge. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of the problems inherent in hybrid design.

J Martin Stafford; In Defence of Sensualism: a reply to M. J. Newby, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 123–128, https:/.

J Martin Stafford; In Defence of Sensualism: a reply to M. J. Newby, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 123–128, https:/.

J Martin Stafford; Marxism, Neutrality and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 161–166, https://doi.org/10.111.

J Martin Stafford; A Rejoinder to Professor Edgley, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 171–174, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

J Martin Stafford; A Rejoinder to Professor Edgley, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 171–174, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

J Martin Stafford; John Wilson, Prophet of the Sane Society, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 169–186, https://doi.org.

J Martin Stafford; John Wilson, Prophet of the Sane Society, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 169–186, https://doi.org.

J Martin Stafford; Marxism, Neutrality and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 161–166, https://doi.org/10.111.

J Martin Stafford; Public Schools, Private Privilege and Common Sense, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 137–141, https.

J Martin Stafford; Public Schools, Private Privilege and Common Sense, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 137–141, https.

Philosophy has often been represented by its detractors, and even sometimes by its practitioners, as a subject which, unlike the natural sciences, exhibits a degree of progress far from commensurate with its long history. Many of the questions entertained by the ancients are still very much alive: answers proffered are put forward very tentatively, seldom meet with universal acceptance, and frequently give rise to controversy even more prolific than that which they were intended to lay low.

This long paper (19 pages; about 7,000 words) is a trenchant critique of the first half of David Norton’s 1982 book David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. Norton claims that both Hutcheson and Hume were ‘moral realists’, and imputes to them an inflated moral ontology at sharp variance with what they actually wrote. Indeed, Norton’s interpretation is sustainable only when the texts are grossly misrepresented by paraphrases which say the opposite of what the authors actually wrote. The paper concludes: (...) I agree that Hutcheson and Hume were opposed to nihilistic scepticism, but maintain that their conception of morality was essentially a psychological one, free from metaphysical postulates of any supra-sensory or non-natural moral reality. Therefore, to call them moral realists is misleading. In view of the misunderstandings, misrepresentations, ambiguities, and contradictions which pervade Norton’s arguments, his attempt to establish that there were moral realists must be counted unsuccessful. (shrink)

This is merely a non-commercial limited reprint of two previously published essays. No ISBN. It includes 'Hutcheson, Hume and the Ontology of Morals' (1985) and 'Hume, Spencer and the Standard of Morals' (1983). It was superseded in 1995 by the author's collected ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY AND ETHICS - ISBN 095125944X, which includes these two plus eight other articles.

In two recent pieces Roger Scruton recommends that we should instil in children feelings of revulsion towards homosexuality; whereas the corollaries of his earlier book Sexual Desire contradict this. These inconsistences are exposed and discussedand the preferability of his earlier stance defended.

This essay examines the unsettling claim of Erasmus that “an unjust peace is preferable by far than a just war”—a dictum he retrieves from Cicero but applies to debates about warfare between nations, feuds of religion, and interpersonal conflicts. Embedded in this aphorism is an entire Erasmian ethic of conflict, one wherein he prods leaders and individuals to pay the price for peace by settling on less than desirable and possibly unfair terms, in order to avoid the devastating fallout of (...) full-fledged battle, while preserving the life of nations, the good of a community, the unity of a church, or the welfare of a friendship. With that challenge Erasmus proceeds to unwind just war theory with its own methods, and he does so with a curious but provocative blend of the most ideal of aspirations with utterly realistic challenges of practical reasoning. (shrink)

Given some links between Lyndon’s Interpolation Theorem, term distribution, and Sommers and Englebretsen’s logic, in this contribution we attempt to capture a sense of interpolation for Sommers and Englebretsen’s Term Functor Logic. In order to reach this goal we first expound the basics of Term Functor Logic, together with a sense of term distribution, and then we offer a proof of our main contribution.

Una escala de valores se puede definir mediante dos componentes: un conjunto de valores y una relación de orden. Estos dos componentes dan cuenta de algunas opiniones populares sobre las escalas de valores que favorecen una suerte de relativismo axiológico. En esta contribución proponemos una estrategia de reducción que nos permite aceptar dichos componentes sin necesariamente implicar un relativismo axiológico.

En esta contribución proponemos una representación de un fragmento de la silogística estadística de Thompson usando la lógica de términos de Sommers. El resultado es una interpretación terminista de la silogística estadística.

There are ethical guidelines that form the foundation of the traditional doctor–patient relationship in medicine. Health care providers are under special obligations to their patients. These include obligations to disclose information, to propose alternative treatments that allow patients to make decisions based on their own values, and to have special concern for patients’ best interests. Furthermore, patients know that these obligations exist and so come to their physicians with a significant level of trust. In this sense, therapeutic medicine significantly differs (...) from straightforward business practices such as the buying and selling of houses, cars, cell phones, etc. However, we argue that this relationship differs when medicine is used for enhancement rather than therapy. When patients seek enhancements they are not as vulnerable as when they are ill. And in an enhancement setting, physicians have little role outside of medical risks to discuss motivation and alternatives. Therefore, we conclude that a more reasonable alternative may be for doctors and patients to use ethical norms associated more with straightforward business practices, specifically sales. We believe that full disclosure of this different set of norms will benefit both physicians and patients. (shrink)